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Pre-print of a paper forthcoming in The Nature of Desire Julien Deonna and Federico Lauria 
(OUP), forthcoming 2016.  
 
‘Desires, Dispositions and the Explanation of Action’ 
 
Abstract We often explain human actions by reference to the desires of the person whose 
actions we are explaining: ‘Jane is studying Law because she wants to become a judge’. But 
how do desires explain actions? A widely accepted view is that desires are dispositional 
states that are manifested in behavior. Accordingly, desires explain actions as ordinary 
physical dispositions, such as fragility or conductivity, explain their manifestations, namely 
causally. This paper argues that desires are manifested both internally, in thoughts, feelings 
and emotional reactions, and in outward behavior and, moreover, that desires are 
‘manifestation-dependent’ dispositions: dispositions whose existence depends on their having 
been manifested. This important feature of desires should feature in any account of how 
desires explain actions. 
 
 
In this paper I examine a familiar conception of desires and of their role in the explanation of 
action. The conception is exemplified in Davidson’s influential 1963 paper ‘Actions, 
Reasons, and Causes’, which opens with the question: 
What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the 
action by giving the agent’s reason for doing what he did? (Davidson, 1963, 685). 
The answer that Davidson defended in that paper, which subsequently became the orthodoxy 
in action theory, is that the relation between the reason that explains an action and the 
explained action is that of cause and effect and that, therefore, explanations that give the 
agent’s reason for acting, which he called ‘rationalizations’, are ‘a species of causal 
explanation’ (ibid.). The details of the view include a conception of a reason why an agent 
did something. Specifically, Davison claimed that  
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Giving the reason why an agent did something is often a matter of naming the pro 
attitude (a) or the related belief (b) or both; let me call this pair the primary reason 
why the agent performed the action (Davidson, 1963, 686). 
‘Pro attitude’ is a semi-technical term intended by Davidson to include, among other things, 
‘desires, wantings, urges, promptings, (…) in so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes of 
an agent directed toward actions of a certain kind’ (1963, 686). His characterization of 
desires is not precise but he implicitly endorses the view that desires are dispositional states 
and that, like other dispositions, they are causal conditions of the actions they explain. This is 
evident in his response to the objection that a primary reason ‘consist of attitudes and beliefs, 
which are states or dispositions, not events; therefore they cannot be causes’ (1963, 693): 
It is easy to reply that states, dispositions, and conditions are frequently named as the 
causes of events: the bridge collapsed because of a structural defect; the plane crashed 
on takeoff because the air temperature was abnormally high; the plate broke because 
it had a crack (694). 
The gist of this response is, then, that desires and beliefs are states or dispositions but that 
doesn’t imply that they are not causes, since states and dispositions are often named as the 
causes of events. Perhaps, Davidson goes on to say, such states and dispositions are causes 
only on the assumption that there was a triggering event but, again, that does not impugn 
their status as causes or, more precisely, causal conditions of the events they explain.1 
The view that desires, and indeed many psychological states, are dispositional states is widely 
held: in fact it is often taken as obvious.2 And so is the view that dispositions are causes (or 
causal conditions) of their manifestations: fragility is often cited as the cause of a fragile 
object’s breaking, solubility as the cause of the dissolving of soluble things, malleability of 
the change in shape of malleable things, etc.3 It is this view of desires that I shall examine in 
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this paper. My aim is relatively modest. I shall not argue against this view of how desires 
explain actions when they are cited in explanations, nor give a fully-worked out alternative. 
Rather, my aim is to argue that if desires are dispositions, they are dispositions with a 
distinctive feature that sets them apart from ordinary physical dispositions, such as fragility 
or conductivity and, briefly, to suggest that this feature of desires may favor a particular 
approach to thinking about how desires explain actions when they feature in action 
explanations. The structure of the paper is as follows. In §1, after some preliminary 
clarifications, I outline the idea that desires are dispositional states. I then (§2) examine the 
various ways in which desires are manifested and, in the following section (§3), I turn to the 
question how that manifestation relates to the presence of a desire. I suggest that the nature of 
that relationship makes desires into a special kind of disposition: what I call ‘manifestation-
dependent’ dispositions. My concluding remarks relate this feature of desires to the question 
how desires explain actions.  
 
1. Desires as dispositional states 
 
‘Desire’ is used in philosophy in a semi-technical sense. In ordinary contemporary usage 
‘desire’ is more often reserved for desires related to the natural appetites: desires for food, 
warmth, comfort, sleep, etc. and, in particular, for sexual desire. By contrast, in philosophy 
the term normally covers any state of wanting or desiring (but see Schueler, 1995). Some 
philosophers sometimes use ‘desire’ interchangeably with ‘pro-attitude’, while others restrict 
it to refer to states that form a species within that genus. In this latter usage, desires are 
sometimes contrasted with, say, wishes, hopes, longings or cravings. Each of those four 
concepts (and there are others) differs somewhat from the others as well as from the concept 
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of desire with which they are contrasted: the first two overlap with desire in involving a 
positive evaluation of their object but differ from it in that they are not tied, or not so closely, 
to behavior as desire is. The last two terms are less clearly linked to positive evaluation. But 
all of them, as well as related concepts, are generally regarded as sufficiently close to each 
other so that they tend to be brought together under umbrella terms such as Davidson’s ‘pro-
attitude’.  
In this paper I shall be concerned primarily with desires in the semi-technical and somewhat 
restricted philosophical sense just outlined. So I shall leave aside for the most part other pro-
attitudes such as wishes, hopes, longings and cravings, and shall not be concerned with 
whether what I say about desires is also true of any of these ‘pro-attitudes’ or indeed of other 
psychological states. 
A further clarification is that my focus is the concept of desire in the sense of someone’s 
desiring something. It is a familiar point that the term ‘desire’, like many other psychological 
terms such as ‘belief’, ‘conviction’, ‘statement’, etc., suffers from what might be called a 
‘state/object’ ambiguity or double use to the term (See Oddie, this volume). So ‘my desire’ 
may be used to talk about my desiring something, or to talk about what I desire: for instance, 
to talk about my desiring to carry the vote at a meeting, and what I desire, namely to carry the 
vote at the meeting. This paper is concerned with desires understood as a state of desiring 
something. 
So what is it to desire something?. A common answer in the philosophical literature is that 
desiring something, like believing something, is or consists in, being in a state, namely a state 
of desiring.4 However, if desiring is being in a state, it is not a state that need be manifested 
throughout all the time when one has the desire. For instance, a person may have a desire for 
financial security over a period of time and yet, at some points in that period she may not 
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manifest the desire in any way: that is, she may not talk or think about it then, or be doing 
anything in order to satisfy the desire. Because of this, because desires are states which may 
be manifested in a variety of ways but which need not, at any one time, be manifested in any 
of those ways, it seems plausible to think of desires as dispositional states: states that, 
perhaps together with other dispositional states such as the subject’s beliefs or knowledge, 
dispose the agent to certain forms of behavior, thoughts, mental images, emotional reactions, 
sensations, feelings, etc. Thus, many philosophers today think of desires as belonging to the 
category of dispositions, and think that they are ‘multi-track’ dispositions, that is that they are 
dispositions that can be manifested in a variety of ways. So how are desires manifested? 
 
2. Desires and their manifestation  
 
Let me start with a point about the notion of manifestation of a disposition. When we talk 
about the manifestation of a disposition, we tend to think of the occurrence of certain sorts of 
physical changes or processes that are related to the disposition (indeed, are defining of the 
disposition) – changes or processes that are in principle ‘observable’.5 However, although 
this may be right for inanimate things, human psychological dispositions are different 
because they are dispositions that may be manifested both in observable occurrences that 
include, but are not limited to, purposive behavior;6 or they can be manifested in ‘purely 
mental’ ways, that is, in thoughts, sensations, feelings, emotional reactions, etc. that need not 
have any outward or public expression. Accordingly, psychological dispositions can be 
manifested ‘externally’ or ‘internally’ as we might say.7  
Desires are manifested externally in what seem to be two categorical different types of 
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manifestation. First, they are manifested in behavior, which may be purposive or simply 
expressive.8 Secondly, desires are manifested in physiological changes in the agent that has 
the desire – changes that do not amount to behavior. The categorical distinction between 
behavior and mere physiological changes is drawn on the basis of the fact that there are 
things that we do that are, in principle and to some extent, under our direct control even if 
their occurrence is not intentional on a particular occasion, while others are never under our 
direct control. To illustrate: grabbing and cursing are, on this characterization, behavioral 
manifestations; while sweating and salivating are not – they are mere physiological changes.  
The behavior that manifests desires may, in turn, be of two kinds: purposive or merely 
expressive (‘merely expressive’, because purposive behavior may also be expressive). A 
desire is manifested in purposive behavior when the agent who has the desire engages in goal 
directed behavior: the agent acts so as to bring about what the desire is a desire for and adapts 
its behavior to that end. The adaptation of behaviour is shaped by the agent’s exercise of its 
cognitive abilities; that is to say, the agent directs its behavior according to its cognition of 
the circumstances – cognition that may be perceptual or of some other kind (for instance, 
inferential), and may or may not involve the manipulation of concepts. In cases where the 
agent is not capable of concept manipulation (most animals), cognition shapes behavior 
through the discriminatory capacities of the agent. In cases of agents capable of concept 
manipulation whose desires are manifested in purposive action, cognition can shape behavior 
in several ways: in the conceptualization of the object of desire; in reasoning about whether 
and how to satisfy the desire; and in the exercise of the range of cognitive capacities 
(perceptual, inferential, perhaps intuitive, etc.) required to guide his or her behavior towards 
the intended goal. In such cases, purposive behavior is not only goal directed but also 
typically guided by reasons (See Döring this volume). 
	 7	
Accordingly, the desire to eat can be manifested in eating but also in food searching and 
grabbing behavior, both of which are purposive behavior; and in the case of humans, the 
desire to eat can also be manifested in linguistic expressions – which may be purposive or 
merely expressive (see below). Likewise, a desire to buy a car may be manifested in buying a 
car, but it can also be manifested in actions conducive to doing so, for instance, in finding out 
about the different virtues of various cars; saving money to buy a car, perhaps by foregoing 
other purchases, and so on.  
Desires are also manifested in behavior that is not purposive but is, as I noted above, merely 
expressive. For example, the desire to eat may be manifested in crying (for instance, in 
babies), meowing (in cats) and, for adult humans, as suggested above, in linguistic ways, 
such as the exclamation ‘I’m hungry!’. Similarly, the desire to buy a car may be manifested 
in talking about cars, expressions (e.g. linguistic or facial expressions) of disappointment 
when finding out that car taxes have gone up, such as looking sad, or cursing; or in 
expressions of joy, such as smiling, laughing or cheering, when realizing that one can now 
afford the desired car or that one is about to buy it. 
A distinctive feature of desires is that, at least for humans (I leave aside whether this is also 
true of any other animals), it is often possible to suppress what would be a behavioral 
manifestation of a desire one has – for instance, by choosing not to act in ways that would 
lead to the satisfaction of the desire, by suppressing its linguistic expression and even voicing 
a contrary or contradictory desire, or by suppressing the expression of the associated 
emotions: hiding one’s disappointment or anger, pretending or declaring that one feels the 
opposite emotion, and so on. In other words, agents can sometimes choose whether to 
manifest their desires behaviourally.  
Desires also have, I suggested above, external but non-behavioral manifestations – which are 
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manifestations that are not typically under our control: we can neither bring them about nor 
suppress them at will, though we can often do things at will that will result in the occurrence 
of those sorts of changes. These manifestations may be purely physiological changes, or they 
may be changes tied to emotions such as fear, joy, anxiety, etc. For example, desires may be 
manifested in bodily changes such as salivation or tummy rumblings (purely physiological), 
or in trembling (with fear), blushing (in anger), or getting flushed (with excitement) at the 
thought or sight of what one wants, or of getting it, or of losing it, and so on.  
So much for the external manifestations of desires. The internal manifestations of desires 
include thoughts (contemplative, imaginative, calculative, etc.), emotional reactions, mental 
images, and sensations and feelings of various kinds. The sensations that manifest a desire 
may be those that accompany related thoughts and emotions, such as feelings of fear, 
anticipation or delight, or sensations associated with bodily appetites, etc. And the thoughts, 
mental images or daydreams that constitute manifestations of a desire may be of the kind that 
come unbidden, or they may be the result of intentional mental activity, such as purposeful 
deliberation or imagining. Thus, my engaging in deliberation about how to achieve 
something and the relative costs of doing so, etc. and my deliberately imagining satisfying 
the desire can also be manifestations of a desire, as can be one’s emotional reactions and 
feelings to these (See Schroeder, this volume, on deliberation concerning desires).  
When desires are manifested in this internal way, they may also be manifested externally and 
so the desire may be attributed to the agent on the basis of those external manifestations. But 
regardless of whether desires are externally manifested or not, these internal phenomena may 
constitute manifestations of a desire, if only to oneself: my well-concealed feelings of envy 
on hearing of a friend’s professional success may make me realize that, contrary to what I 
thought, I do want to achieve professional recognition. In such cases, I may then see some of 
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my past actions in a new light, e.g. see them as directed at achieving such recognition and 
hence as manifestations of my desire. But it is also possible that the feeling of envy should be 
the first manifestation of my desire. Because of this, it is possible that sometimes only its 
possessor may be in a position to recognize that she has a certain desire, although this is by 
no means always the case. Indeed, often the opposite is true: others can be in a position to tell 
us about unacknowledged desires by witnessing their various external manifestations. And of 
course sometimes oneself and others may misinterpret manifestations of a desire for A as 
those of a desire for B. And so on. 
Desires have this range of internal and external manifestations partly because desires are 
linked to pleasure and pain in various ways. So desiring is a state that often brings with it 
pain or displeasure, whether in the form of a sensation, or a negative psychological state, 
such as frustration, fear, annoyance, etc., which may raise from the as-yet unsatisfied desire 
or from the frustration of the desire. The satisfaction of desire typically brings with it (a 
degree of) pleasure, as does the anticipation of satisfaction. To be sure, sometimes the 
satisfaction of a desire is disappointing (for instance, less pleasant than one expected); 
distasteful (one may be disgusted with oneself and/or feel sick after having given in to a 
desire to eat three cream doughnuts; or after doing something one felt one had to do, and in 
that sense wanted to do but also found repugnant to do); or regarded by the agent as an 
outright disaster (perhaps very little pleasure and much pain comes from the satisfaction of 
the desire). Still, there is often some pleasure in getting what one wants even if it is very 
short-lived, and if the pleasure merely consists in the assuaging of the discomfort or 
frustration of desiring; and repugnance or distaste may be mixed with the pleasure of having 
done one’s duty, or having got an unpleasant task out of the way, and so on. Moreover, even 
when there is very little and short-lived pleasure, there tends to be some pleasure in the 
anticipation of satisfaction. Thus, pleasure, pain or displeasure (physical or psychological) 
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cause, are caused by and manifested in purposive behavior (towards or away from the 
object), expressive behavior, emotional reactions, feelings, thoughts, etc. 
So we have seen that desires can be manifested externally in purposive behavior (including in 
actions done for reasons), in expressive behavior, or in physiological changes; and also 
internally in certain patterns of thoughts, sensations, emotional reactions, etc. which may, in 
turn, be externally expressed. 
It could be objected that, although in a sense of the word ‘manifestation’ that means simply 
‘making evident’ these are all possible ways in which desires are manifested, they are not all 
manifestations of a desire in the sense of ‘manifestation’ relevant to a disposition. For 
dispositions, the thought goes, are defined by their manifestations, so fragility is the 
disposition to break in certain circumstances, and solubility is the disposition to dissolve, 
etc.9 But it seems that some of the possible manifestations I have described above, such as 
thoughts, feelings or physiological changes, are not ‘defining’ of say, the desire to marry 
someone, or to kiss them.10 However, while characterizing what counts as the manifestation 
of a disposition is relatively easy in cases of simple dispositions, such as fragility or solubility 
(what Ryle calls ‘single-track dispositions’, see Ryle 1948, 44), the task is complicated when 
the disposition is something like a desire or a belief because, as Ryle says, they are 
dispositions ‘the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous’ (44). To illustrate the 
point, Ryle says: 
When Jane Austen wished to show the specific kind of pride which characterised the 
heroine of ‘Pride and Prejudice’, she had to represent her actions, words, thoughts and 
feelings in a thousand different situations. There is no one standard type of action or 
reaction such that Jane Austen could say ‘My heroine’s kind of pride was just the 
tendency to do this, whenever a situation of that sort arose’ (44). 
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So although actions, and among them ‘overt’ actions (i.e. those involving bodily behavior), 
are a central way in which desires are manifested, they are not the only way, and so there is 
no reason to disregard the other possible ways in which they are manifested. Because of this, 
it should now be clear that our initial question about how desires explain actions should be 
illuminated by exploring generally the nature of the relationship between desiring something 
and the whole range of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ manifestations of that desire, since the range 
includes intentional actions. I turn to that question in the next section, where I argue that 
there is a feature of the relationship between desires and their manifestations that sets them 
apart from ordinary physical dispositions often discussed in the literature, such as solubility, 
elasticity, fragility, etc..11 
 
3. Desires as ‘manifestation-dependent’ dispositions 
 
The SEP entry for dispositions says that ‘in general, it seems that nothing about the actual 
behavior of an object is ever necessary for it to have the dispositions it has’ (Sungho, 2004). 
This is clearly intended as a claim about the concept of a disposition, and the term ‘actual 
behavior’ is meant to include not just the current or past actual behavior, but the actual 
behavior of an object over its lifetime. So a particular thing may have a disposition such as 
fragility or solubility even if the thing itself never has and never will manifest it. Thus, a 
particular lump of sugar or pinch of salt is said to be soluble (have a disposition to dissolve in 
certain conditions), a particular glass vase or a ceramic tile is said to be fragile (disposed to 
break under certain kinds of stress) even if they never have and never will dissolve or break. 
Typically these dispositions have categorical basis as well as certain necessary conditions for 
their manifestation (conditions that enable the disposition to be manifested), as well as 
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requiring a stimulus or trigger that brings about their manifestation –12 though it has proved 
singularly difficult to specify what these conditions and triggers are, even for fairly simple 
dispositions, such as for fragility, as is shown by the failures so far of attempts to provide a 
satisfactory conditional analysis of dispositions.13 This is because an object or portion of stuff 
can have a disposition that is not manifested even when the trigger occurs, because of the 
presence of masks, antidotes or finks and, in such cases, the failure of manifestation does not 
imply the absence of the disposition. The recent literature on dispositions is full of such 
examples: fragile glasses wrapped in Styrofoam that do not shatter when struck, poisonous 
pills that do not poison if ingested together with an antidote, ‘finked’ live wires that don’t 
conduct electricity when electric currents are applied, and so on.14 So a particular may have a 
disposition it never manifests, either because it is never in the required conditions (enabling 
conditions, plus trigger), or perhaps because it is but something blocks or otherwise prevents 
its manifestation. The important point for my purposes is that a particular thing may have a 
disposition that it never manifests. 
By contrast, there seem to be dispositions that are what might be called ‘manifestation- 
dependent’: the absence of the manifestation over the lifetime of the object implies the 
absence of the disposition. That is, contrary to what the SEP entry quoted above says, there 
are dispositions that an individual has only if it has already manifested it at some point over 
its lifetime. And this dependence of the disposition on its manifestation is not epistemic; that 
is, it is not that in the absence of the manifestation we cannot know whether the object has the 
disposition. Rather, the dependence is constitutive – certain types of disposition are not 
present if they are not manifested: it is part of the concept of a disposition of this kind that its 
presence implies its manifestation at some point in the past. These dispositions imply not just 
that its possessor would or has the power to do certain things or to undergo certain changes in 
certain circumstances but that it has done those things or undergone those changes. Being a 
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smoker and being generous, for example are such dispositions: a smoker is someone who has 
a disposition to smoke even while he’s not smoking but someone who has never smoked is 
not a smoker, just as someone may be generous without now manifesting that character trait 
in any way but someone who has never had a generous reaction, thought or feeling, or has 
never performed a generous deed is not generous.15 The point about these dispositions is not 
that they are frequently manifested but rather that, unlike other dispositions, attribution of the 
disposition depends (logically) on its having been manifested.  
I want to suggest that desires are dispositions of this kind. My claim is that it is part of the 
concept of desire that someone has a desire at time t, only if the desire has been manifested in 
any of the various ways I described above at some point up to and including time t. So I have 
the desire to eat spinach or to become a barrister, only if at some point up to the present I 
have manifested that desire in any of the ways described above (but of course not necessarily 
in behavior). Desires are dispositions such that someone who has a desire is someone of 
whom is true, not just that she would or can do certain things, but that she has done or is 
doing certain things: has had or is having certain thoughts, feelings and emotions, or has 
behaved or is behaving in certain ways, etc.. 
Note that I am not suggesting that desires are dependent on any one of the possible ways in 
which they are manifested, whether internally or externally, for they clearly are not: someone 
can have a desire in the absence a manifestation of any one or several of those kinds. So one 
may have the desire to eat without acting on the desire but not without at least thinking about 
it, or having certain feelings, sensations, etc.; or one may want to put out the washing without 
feeling particularly emotionally engaged in the issue and one may want to become a dentist 
without really thinking about it at the time or experiencing any sensations relating to it; but in 
both cases there must still be some other way in which the desire has been or is being 
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manifested. The literature is full of examples where a desire is plausibly claimed to be 
present in the absence of one or several of these sorts of typical manifestations; and this has 
in fact led to competing views about what is essential to the concept of desire.16 Rather, my 
point is that the concept of desire in in fact essentially connected to the range of phenomena 
that constitute their possible manifestations and, therefore, that an agent cannot 
(conceptually) have a desire in the absence of all of those manifestations over the agent’s 
lifetime: the range of possible manifestations is constitutive of the concept of having a desire. 
Moreover, the various manifestations of a desire are criteria for the strength of desire: the 
more one feels inclined to satisfy a desire (i.e. the harder it is to suppress the relevant 
purposive behavior), the stronger the associated sensations, emotions, the more acute the 
physiological changes, the more frequent related thoughts about it and relatedly, the harder it 
is to suppress the associated expressive behavior, the stronger the desire. Desires are, then, a 
kind of manifestation-dependent disposition. 
It might be objected that this alleged difference from ordinary dispositions is only apparent. 
For, it might be argued, just as an object may have an ordinary physical disposition but not 
manifest it because it is not in the right conditions, or because of the presence of a mask, 
antidote, fink, etc., that blocks its manifestation, a person may have a desire that she has 
never manifested because of the presence of a mask or antidote, for instance because of 
injury, paralysis, physical coercion, perhaps contrary desires, etc.. And, therefore, as with 
other dispositions, the failure of manifestation does not imply the absence of the disposition, 
i.e. of the desire.  
However, there is an important difference concerning the possibility of preventing the 
manifestation of the disposition between the two types of case. For it is true that one can 
prevent external manifestation of desires, for example by paralyzing someone, but even then 
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it will still be possible for the desire to be manifested in thoughts, emotions, etc.. And so, in 
order to prevent or block all possible manifestations of a desire, the person must be incapable 
of thought or feeling, so she must be either totally unconscious (i.e. in a total coma) or dead. 
The dead have no desires, 17 and, while a totally unconscious person may still have the desires 
she had before entering that state, those desires will be attributed to her on the basis of her 
having been manifested them somehow in the past. On the other hand, it is implausible to 
argue that she can acquire new desires during her coma. To be sure, she could expresses a 
new desire on waking up but there’s no grounds for saying that she had the desire but did not 
manifest it while in a coma, rather than that she acquired the desire and expressed it on 
waking up. In other words, it is implausible to argue that a person can be in a state that makes 
it impossible for her to manifest her desires in any way but can, during that time, acquire new 
desires. Thus the objection fails: although preventing the external manifestation of a desire in 
whatever way (physical injury, paralysis, etc.) does not imply its absence, the fact that a 
desire has never been manifested in any internal or external way does: that is simply part of 
the concept of desire.18  
This may seem unconvincing for surely, it might be argued, it is possible for one to discover 
that one had a desire one didn’t know about. For instance, mention or perception of the object 
of desire may elicit certain reactions, internal or external, which evince the presence of a 
desire that, until then, perhaps no one, including the agent herself, knew she had. And surely 
the right way to construe such cases is to say that these reactions (internal or external) are 
evidence for its antecedent presence: the desire was there all along and the reactions simply 
reveal its existence. But this is also implausible. First, if the object of desire is something the 
agent was not at all familiar with, then it is wholly implausible to suggest that the agent’s 
reaction is a manifestation of a desire that was there all along. It is true that a person may 
desire something, say, to have peace of mind and discover that something else, say, retiring is 
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just what she’d always wanted because it brings peace of mind. That, however, is not 
discovering a desire she has always had but never manifested. It is rather discovering that a 
desire she’d manifested (perhaps in certain feelings of unhappiness, or thoughts and actions 
about how to get peace of mind) could be satisfied in ways she didn’t know about. If, by 
contrast, the object of desire is something already familiar to the agent, then it is wholly 
implausible to say that in the absence of any previous relevant thoughts, emotions, behavior, 
etc., the agent already had the desire for that thing because, again, there seem to be no 
grounds for attributing an antecedent desire, rather than a newly acquired desire. To be sure, 
reflection on some already familiar object of desire may help one to remember or perhaps 
recognize past emotional and thought patterns as manifestations of a desire for that thing (or 
of aversion to it) but then that is a desire that had already been manifested. So desires are 
manifestation-dependent dispositions. 
This feature of desires does not impugn the dispositional nature of desires, since a desire that 
has been manifested in one way can still be regarded as a dispositional state that could be 
further manifested in other ways.19 But, and this is the point I want to emphasize, this feature 
does mark desires (along with some other psychological states) off from dispositions such as 
fragility, solubility, or conductivity, which may be present in an object despite the object’s 
never having manifested them in any way. For in the case of desires, the presence of the 
acquisition of a desire, the disposition, coincides with at least one of its manifestation. This, it 
may be thought, is odd, as there do not seem to be other dispositions that are acquired only at 
the point at which they are first manifested. But that is gist to the mill: if desires are 
dispositions, they, together with at least some other psychological states, have some peculiar 
features which seem to set them apart from the familiar physical dispositions.  
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Conclusion 
 
As I noted at the beginning of the paper, a very familiar view about how desires explain 
actions is that they do so just as dispositions in general explain their manifestations. And 
dispositions are said to explain their manifestations causally: dispositions are antecedent 
causal conditions which, when triggered by some stimulus, cause their manifestations to 
occur. We have seen, however, that desires are a distinctive kind of disposition, what I have 
called ‘manifestation-dependent’ dispositions. And that this means that attributions of desires 
are best understood as partly records of present or past occurrences (internal or external) and 
partly as grounds for predictions of what the agent who has the desire is likely to think, feel, 
do, etc.. I want to finish the paper with the suggestion that this feature of desires means that 
one illuminating way of thinking of how desires explain actions is by seeing those actions as 
part of an intelligible pattern formed by the agent’s past and future behavior, thoughts, 
feelings, emotions, etc. in the context in which the agent acted, a pattern that we regard as the 
manifestation of the desire in question. Because of this, at any point, which desire should be 
attributed to an agent as explanatory of her action is importantly constrained by whether the 
action fits best into one or another of the intelligible patterns of manifestation of the different 
desires that the agent can be plausibly thought to have given the context. The suggestion is 
that given the nature of desires, there is more to be said in favor of the view that explanation 
of action by reference to desires are ‘context-placing’ explanations.20 These remarks about 
desires do not of course constitute anything like an account of how desires explain actions but 
I hope to have provided grounds for thinking that thinking of them in the way suggested may 
be a fruitful way of going about that task.21 
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1 Davidson adds that, although we are not always in a position to know what the triggering 
event was, we know that there must have been one. And this is true for explanations of 
inanimate events, which we take to be causal, as well as for action explanations. 
2 C.B. Martin, for example, writes: ‘The fact that belief and desire states are dispositional is 
both familiar and obvious’ (Martin, 2008, 184). This is a widespread view in the literature on 
dispositions, see e.g. McKitrick 2004, 2. In the philosophy of mind, different views highlight 
different concepts in order to characterise desires: behaviour, pleasure/pain, the good, reward, 
etc. (see T. Schroeder, 2004). But most, if not all, of those views are compatible with the idea 
that desires are dispositional states. 
3 The view is widely but not universally held. It has been rejected by some who argue, for 
example, that it is a disposition’s causal basis, rather than the disposition, that is causally 
relevant, or causally efficacious. The rejection is implicit in David Lewis’s remark that, if one 
takes dispositions to be distinct from their bases: ‘I take for granted that a disposition requires 
	 22	
																																																																																																																																																																												
a certain causal basis: one has the disposition iff one has a property that occupies a certain 
causal role’ (Lewis, 1986, 223-4. See also Prior, Pargeter & Jackson, 1982). The causal role 
that the causal basis of a disposition plays is precisely to bring about the manifestation of the 
disposition. I put aside this objection because, if right, it applies to all dispositions and not 
just to desires, which is the topic at issue. For a critical discussion of this suggestion see 
McKitrick, 2004.. 
4	Desires are also sometimes thought of as ‘propositional attitudes’ (following Russell 1918, 
[2010, 60].) This characterization, however, is not ideal, as I and others have argued (See 
Schueler, 1991 , Zangwill, 1998 and Alvarez 2010, 66ff .) Briefly, it cannot accommodate the 
desires of creatures who lack the ability to entertain propositions, such as babies and (most?) 
non-human animals (See also Döring and Friedrich, this volume).	 
5 A disposition may also be manifested in preventing, sustaining, etc. changes or processes 
that would otherwise occur – but this sort of manifestation is also in principle observable. For 
ease of exposition I shall talk of manifestations as occurrences but using the term to include 
all these things. 
6 ‘Observable occurences’ is here to be contrasted with the internal manifestations I outline in 
the main text. There are also neuro-physiological changes inside the body correlated with 
desires that I do not include these among the ‘internal’ manifestations partly because they are 
in principle also observable - though not without the aid of a special apparatus. Internal 
physiological changes could also count as, in some sense, external ‘manifestations’ of a state 
of desiring – at least in the sense that they are correlated with the presence of the desire. But 
it matters that the identification of such neuro-physiological changes as ‘manifestations’ of a 
particular desire depends on their correlation with the external and internal manifestations 
described in the main text. 
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7 Schwitzgebel, 2002 makes a similar point about the manifestation of beliefs. This view is 
found also in Quine, 1990.  
8 I use the term ‘purposive behavior’ to include intentional behavior, which is typically what 
we do for reasons (though there may be things done intentionally but not for a reason), but 
also the behavior of animals that are not capable of reasoning. And the term ‘behavior’ is 
intended to include linguistic behavior, as well as refrainings, etc. (see Alvarez, 2013). 
9 In saying this I am not endorsing the possibility of a conditional analysis of a disposition in 
terms of trigger, circumstances and manifestation. 
10 So, for example, John Hyman writes: 
a desire is manifested in two main ways: first, by purposive or goal-directed 
behaviour, specifically, behaviour aimed at satisfying the desire, in other words, at 
getting what it is a desire to have, or at doing what it is a desire to do; and second, by 
feeling glad, pleased or relieved if the desire is satisfied, and sorry, displeased or 
disappointed if it is frustrated (Hyman, 2014, 85). 
And he adds that there are other things related to desires that may be sings or symptoms of 
desires but these are not manifestations of the desire. But even if it’s right the mere 
physiological changes are not manifestations but only signs or symptoms of desire, Hyman’s 
range of possible manifestations seems too narrow. For in addition to purposive acting and 
feelings, there is a range of (intentional and non-intentional) mental activity as well as 
expressive non-purposive behavior that seem legitimate candidates to be counted among 
possible manifestations of a desire.  Unless we have a principled way of deciding what is a 
genuine manifestation of a desire, the claim that only goal-directed behavior and feelings of 
pleasure or displeasure concerning its satisfaction or frustration count as manifestations 
seems a stipulation. 
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11 The distinctive feature is also had by other psychological dispositional states, for instance, 
character traits, and perhaps beliefs, although I shall not discuss either of those here. 
12 ‘Typically’ because it is claimed that there are physical dispositions which are unusual in 
that e.g. they ‘manifest spontaneously, without the need for stimulation’ (Molnar, 2003, 85), 
or others that do not have a categorical base (See McKitrick, 2003, Molnar, 2003, and 
Mumford 2006. But see Armstrong, 1968). 
13 See Martin, 2008, ch.2. 
14 See Cross, 2012 for a summary.  
15 I have argued for this view of character traits in ‘Ryle on Motives and Dispositions’ (in 
Ryle on Mind and Language, Palgrave, 2015).  
16 Thus, some philosophers have privileged one of these concepts (action, pleasure, conscious 
thoughts, etc.) over others in characterising desires, or have even claimed that the preferred 
concept is what desires reduce to. Recently, Tim Schroeder (2004) has criticised many 
traditional positions and proposed an alternative, based on the idea that desire is ‘a natural 
kind’ essentially linked to the concept of reward (though the somewhat technical concept of 
‘reward’ deployed in the empirical literature he discusses.). It is not possible to do justice 
Schroeder’s arguments here but it is worth noting that his criticisms of the rival theories he 
examines are not effective against the sort of pluralist conception of desires suggested above. 
17 I’m putting aside the possibility of life after death because if there is such a thing, one 
would be able to manifest one’s desires then, if only in thought. 
18 It seems, moreover, that desires have no necessary triggers for their manifestation. The 
presence of the object of desire may sometimes act as a trigger for the desire to be manifested 
but one may manifest a desire in the absence of the object of desire or anything connected to 
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it; indeed, the manifestation may consists precisely in spontaneously imagining, thinking 
about, or seeking the object of desire (say water, or a new house) in spite of its total absence 
in the agent’s environment, indeed, in spite of its non-existence. I do not mean that nothing 
will have triggered these thoughts, images, etc. but rather that that there is no kind of 
occurrence that is necessary to trigger the manifestation of a desire. Perhaps desires fall under 
what Molnar calls ‘unconditional dispositions’ (2003, 85), which are dispositions that do not 
require special conditions or triggers for their manifestation: their manifestation may be 
triggered by some stimulus but they may also manifest spontaneously. 
19 Of course if the desire is satisfied it will not be manifested further but then it is a desire that 
the agent no longer has. Note that to have what one wants need not be to have one’s desire 
satisfied if one’s desire is, e.g. to keep what one has. 
20 My suggestion is in the same spirit as those in Schroeder 2001 and Tanney, 2009. I do not 
take the remarks above, however, to constitute an argument against the claim that 
reason/desire explanations are causal, not least because the truth of the claim depends largely 
on what makes an explanation causal, an issue that seems to me far from straightforward. 
21 I would like to thank Edgar Phillips and the editors of this collection for very helpful 
comments on previous versions of this paper. 
